Follow Slashdot stories on Twitter


Forgot your password?
Security Hardware Linux

Hiding Backdoors In Hardware 206

quartertime writes "Remember Reflections on Trusting Trust, the classic paper describing how to hide a nearly undetectable backdoor inside the C compiler? Here's an interesting piece about how to hide a nearly undetectable backdoor inside hardware. The post describes how to install a backdoor in the expansion ROM of a PCI card, which during the boot process patches the BIOS to patch grub to patch the kernel to give the controller remote root access. Because the backdoor is actually housed in the hardware, even if the victim reinstalls the operating system from a CD, they won't clear out the backdoor. I wonder whether China, with its dominant position in the computer hardware assembly business, has already used this technique for espionage. This perhaps explains why the NSA has its own chip fabrication plant."
This discussion has been archived. No new comments can be posted.

Hiding Backdoors In Hardware

Comments Filter:
  • by mlts ( 1038732 ) * on Friday October 29, 2010 @12:13PM (#34063732)

    A good example of this is Lojack for Laptops to see about having stuff in hardware be able to keep a program installed and hidden.

  • Re:Not bad but.. (Score:5, Informative)

    by MerlynEmrys67 ( 583469 ) on Friday October 29, 2010 @01:00PM (#34064406)
    Ok - time for a few corrections
    1) First Intel (after initially responding poorly to the bug) fully recalled the product without question. If you had a processor in question, you could ask for and recieve a replacement. Please see []
    2) The flaw was caused by a bad division lookup table, not the mathematical nuance of binary logic gates. What I think you are trying to describe is the fact that floating point numbers are not percise, and you never compare them directly, only compare if they are within a small delta of each other.
  • by alen ( 225700 ) on Friday October 29, 2010 @01:06PM (#34064508)

    i've worked for Uncle Sam for 9 years. the government buys their IT crap from CDW and the same companies corporate america buys from. one time i tried to order laptops direct from Dell and it took months of getting special permission to get it done.

    and the government buys their IT crap little by little like everyone else. a PC here, a server the next month. a few servers and storage a few months later when there is money. one time they bought layer 2 switches in the 1990's which sat around for over a year because there was no money for the contract to install them. at the end of the year a lot of the "unspent" money gets spent on wishlists and you may have hardware bought one year and the labor paid for the next year

  • Re:Not bad but.. (Score:5, Informative)

    by tixxit ( 1107127 ) on Friday October 29, 2010 @01:08PM (#34064538)
    Sandboxie is the name of a program for Windows that can create and run programs in sandboxes.
  • by dwheeler ( 321049 ) on Friday October 29, 2010 @01:46PM (#34065136) Homepage Journal
    The "trusting trust" attack is a nasty attack, but there is a counter-measure. Diverse double-compiling [] can detect compiler executables subverted by the "trusting trust" attack. See my paper for more, if you're curious.
  • by swschrad ( 312009 ) on Friday October 29, 2010 @02:27PM (#34065670) Homepage Journal

    there are also a very limited number of secured chip fabs in the US, plants in which security is so well controlled that they are licensed to produce sensitive silicon for the government. IBM's fab in North Burlington is known to be one of them. you used to find all sorts of custom logic with IBM on the top in things like ethernet cards and video chipsets and the like. no more. no capacity.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday October 29, 2010 @02:31PM (#34065718)

    Government fab plants and paying premiums for every part. People shouldn't bitch about taxes and deficits unless they are willing to cut defense spending also.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday October 29, 2010 @05:34PM (#34068362)

    Why so snarky?

    Are you just naive, or English is not your first language?

    The GP was saying "we" as in "other than me or the people I know around me". The parent than pointed out that the GP has an Ubuntu address, Ubuntu is believed (justly or not) to not contribute much to the Linux community and specifically have a history of making grand proclamations about what people other than them need to be doing to improve the Linux experience (whether or not they are right doesn't matter, the Linux community is built of anti-establishment types who resent being told what they should do regardless of justification).

  • by spidr_mnky ( 1236668 ) on Friday October 29, 2010 @05:58PM (#34068598)

    Yes. In the purest form of DDC, you would need to implement a compiler, an OS to host it, and possibly the hardware to run that OS, from scratch. The saving grace is that it doesn't have to be a very good compiler, or a very fun OS to use, or a very fast computer. As long as it generates correctly compiled code, you can use it to compile your good compiler.

    Meanwhile, on your Dell running Red Hat, you compile your good compiler (we'll just say it's GCC) using your existing copy of GCC. Now you've got two second generation compilers. Their internal code should differ drastically, but their output should be identical.

    Use each of them to compile GCC once again, and you should have two identical executable blobs.

    In a less thorough version of the same exercise, you can just use two compilers that don't share a pedigree, and hence are unlikely to be infected with the same compiler-resident bug. Even in the strict form, however, you "only" have to generate a working compiler, not a highly optimized and highly optimizing compiler.

    It's not like it could be a weekend project for me, but it also doesn't mean duplicating 20 years of development work. You still end up with GCC (or whatever), and you add the ability to trust your code at the price of developing a compiler.

Reactor error - core dumped!