NSA Develops USB Storage Device Detector 233
Hugh Pickens writes "Bob Brewin writes on NextGov that the National Security Agency has developed a software tool that detects thumb drives or other flash media connected to a network. The NSA says the tool, called the USBDetect 3.0 Computer Network Defense Tool, provides 'network administrators and system security officials with an automated capability to detect the introduction of USB storage devices into their networks. This tool closes potential security vulnerabilities; a definite success story in the pursuit of the [Defense Department] and NSA protect information technology system strategic goals.' The tool gathers data from the registry on Microsoft Windows machines (PDF) and reports whether storage devices, such as portable music or video players, external hard drives, flash drives, jump drives, or thumb drives have been connected to the USB port. 'I have a hunch that a bunch of other agencies use the detection software,' writes Brewin."
Arms race anyone? (Score:4, Insightful)
"USB Detect detects the use of removable drives"
"Shadow Drive evades detection by the following products"
"Latest USB Detect detects Shadow Drive use!"
"New ShadowDrive 2.0!"
Shit, the parent company of both products could make a killing! Hey wait a minute, is this another lame
attempt to bring money in off the books for illegal ops?
-Steve
3.0? (Score:3, Insightful)
So if this is 3.0 can I assume they have had the tool for some time. Why are bothering to tell anyone at this point?
Too easy to circumvent (Score:4, Insightful)
It relies on information from the OS. The OS is too easy to circumuvent. For example, it doesn't report on whether or not the system has been booted from a USB device. Given that they are the NSA, maybe they have the luxury of making the assumption that USB boot is disabled and the BIOS is password protected?
Impervious (Score:3, Insightful)
...because the Windows Registry is a secure source of information...
Re:Wow. (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Wow. (Score:5, Insightful)
Because clearly the NSA started numbering this program at 3.0 just for the hell of it.
Re:3.0? (Score:3, Insightful)
So if this is 3.0 can I assume they have had the tool for some time. Why are bothering to tell anyone at this point?
Check out the comments on this article. They just need a quick dredger to go through and find out what additional security measures need to be programmed into 4.0. No need to do their own research, since they have a million know-it-alls at slashdot happy to tell them how they'd hack the NSA if they were to do it via thumbdrive.
Re:Why only USB? (Score:5, Insightful)
Because DOD got pwned back in November 2008 when some schmuck used a thumbdrive to transfer files between the NIPR and SIPR networks, and they still haven't figured out how to fix the vulnerability.
Re:Wow. (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:Arms race anyone? (Score:5, Insightful)
Yeah, I wrote one of those once. (Score:4, Insightful)
Management eventually figured out that if you couldn't trust the guys you hired, you were screwed from go. More effective to treat your employees fairly in the first place. We stopped installing the service on new machines.
Fun to write though.
-1 Troll (Score:3, Insightful)
Oh, please. Like nobody else has ever created duplicate software before.
Yes, there are probably other utilities that do this. Maybe the NSA was unaware of them. Maybe they were incompatible with their legacy tools or infrastrcture. Maybe they didn't do what the NSA needed.
And even then, sometimes it's worth a rewrite, just to make things better.
Re:If you have physical access to a machine... (Score:4, Insightful)
The intent here is to make it more difficult for insiders to surreptitiously export data without going through proper security controls. This kind of argument always puzzles me. It's like you're saying that because there is no perfect security, we should therefore do nothing.
In a locked-down environment, a user with physical access to a machine may still have difficulty exporting large gobs of data. Transfer over the network may be difficult, and certainly is monitored. Data can be printed out, but this requires a printer, and a way to smuggle paper out of the facility without suspicion. A cell phone with a camera could be used to photograph a computer screen, but this is very low-bandwidth, and certainly looks strange to anyone happening to observe. A USB stick is easily hidden, easily plugged and unplugged, and can have a very large capacity. It's an important vector of attack.
Even without malicious intent, a user might decide for some reason that transferring data via USB stick is more convenient than another method. They may have good intentions, but the data still leaks onto the USB stick and you lose control over it. Just because something could be defeated doesn't make it worthwhile. And software which monitors connected machines for insertion/removal of media is not exactly hard to design. It doesn't cost you a billion dollars.
Re:Arms race anyone? (Score:4, Insightful)
It must suck to be stuck using that old dot-matix printer hanging off the Centronix parallel port. And that serial mouse - a null-modem cable will let me suck the data out of your box just fine. That old-style keyboard plug? Hate to have to buy a new keyboard ... and not be able to plug it in.